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I.  INTRODUCTION 
According to disturbing, if admittedly controversial, estimates found in To Err is 
Human:  Building a Safer Health System, a 1999 report published by the Institute of 
Medicine [hereinafter “IOM”], between 44,000 and 98,000 Americans die each year 
due to preventable medical errors.3  Under these figures, more Americans die in a 
given year as a result of medical errors than from motor vehicle accidents (43,458), 
breast cancer (42,297) or AIDS (16,516).4  Total national costs (lost income, lost 
household production, disability and health care costs) of medical errors that result in 
injury are estimated to be between $17 billion and $29 billion, of which health care 
costs represent over one-half.5  The increased hospital costs of preventable 
medication-related errors to patients alone are estimated to be about $2 billion for the 
nation as a whole.6 
As William C. Richardson, chairman of the panel that conducted the IOM study, 
aptly comments in citing the Hippocratic Oath, “These stunningly high rates of 
medical errors—resulting in deaths, permanent disability and unnecessary 
suffering—are simply unacceptable in a medical system that promises first to ‘do no 
                                                                
1The Samuel H. McCoy II Professor of Law, University of Virginia:  B.A., Dartmouth 
College; J.D., Harvard University. 
2B.A., J.D., University of Virginia.   
3COMMITTEE ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TO ERR 
IS HUMAN 1 (Linda T. Kohn, Janet Corrigan et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter IOM]. See also 
COMMITTEE ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CROSSING 
THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2001) (outlining the 
following six broad aims for improving the safety and quality of health care, but without 
focusing on medical malpractice litigation and its disincentives: safety, efficacy, patient-
centered care, timeliness, efficiency and equitability).  
4Id.  But see infra note 47 and accompanying text. 
5Id. at 1-2. 
6Id. at 27. 
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harm.’”7  Significantly, the IOM contends that most medical errors are not caused by 
the carelessness of individual physicians, nurses, or other hospital personnel; rather, 
they are the result of the cumulative opportunities for human error that inevitably 
arise in today’s complex medical system.8  One area that clearly shows the systemic 
root of medical error involves medication errors.  For example, pharmacists often 
have difficulty deciphering the illegible handwriting of doctors who prescribe drugs.9  
Also, many new drugs have similar names, causing much confusion for doctors, 
nurses, and patients.10  Indeed, some 7,000 hospital patients died in 1993 due to 
medication-related errors alone, more than the number of Americans who die from 
workplace injuries in an average year.11 
The IOM report condemns current systems of dealing with medical mistakes, 
which include a combination of peer reviews, various state and federal regulations 
and sanctions, evaluations by private accrediting bodies, and, lastly, malpractice 
lawsuits.12  The report goes on to make several recommendations in an effort to 
lessen these forbiddingly high rates of medical error.13  Most salient from a tort law 
perspective, the IOM calls for the creation of two distinct reporting systems.14  First, 
the IOM recommends the establishment of a federal mandatory reporting system for 
cases where medical error has led to serious injury or death.15  Medical errors 
identified through this mandatory reporting system would be open to the public and 
unprotected by confidentiality rules.16  Information from this database would thus be 
open to discovery in a lawsuit.  The IOM concedes that liability in tort “serves a 
legitimate role in holding people responsible for their actions.”17 
The report also suggests that minor medical errors that have not resulted in 
serious injury or death be collected in a confidential database that would be 
unavailable to the public.18  By reducing health care providers’ risk of medical 
malpractice lawsuits through the confidentiality of this reporting system, the IOM 
hopes to encourage doctors, nurses, and hospital administrators to be more open 
about minor medical mistakes that have not led to serious adverse events, thereby 
                                                                
7Robert Pear, Group Asking U.S. for New Vigilance in Patient Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
30, 1999, at A1. 
8See IOM, supra note 3, at 3-5. 
9Pear, supra note 7. 
10See Rick Weiss, Medical Errors Blamed for Many Deaths, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1999, 
at A01. 
11IOM, supra note 3, at 27.  
12See generally id. at 1-16. 
13See id. at 5-16. 
14Id. at 8-10. 
15Id. at 9. 
16IOM, supra note 3, at 110. 
17Id. 
18Id. 
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giving the medical community greater opportunities to learn from their mistakes and 
prevent future harm to patients.19 
To remove the fear of personal liability from individual health care workers and 
eliminate the incentive to hide errors rather than report them, the IOM acknowledges 
that tort reform of some sort is also needed.20  Since the IOM calls for shifting 
attention away from the faults of individual care providers to the defects of the 
system itself, the current tort system’s “blame culture” is itself blamed by the IOM 
for providing an impediment to improving the safety of patients by deterring 
physicians from reporting their own errors in the first place.  However, the IOM’s To 
Err is Human does not offer an extensive account of just what tort reform scheme 
should be pursued.  In what follows, the Early Offers plan, created by the first-named 
author, is urged as particularly well-suited to address the problem of medical errors 
dealt with in To Err is Human.  ‘Early Offers’ is not only designed to promote the 
reporting of medical errors by reducing the level of fear and pain associated with 
current medical malpractice law, but at the same time to allow victims of medical 
error to receive compensation earlier and easier.  In so doing, Early Offers promotes 
a better medical and legal culture by rendering the health care and medical 
malpractice systems more Hippocratic—and less hypocritical. 
II.  THE IOM STUDY 
Before entering into a legal discussion concerning the benefits of Early Offers in 
the area of medical malpractice law, this section offers a more detailed account of the 
IOM study.  The need for reform will grow more apparent as more is revealed about 
the complexity of safety problems facing the nation’s health care providers and their 
patients. 
The IOM, a branch of the National Academy of Sciences, is a congressionally 
chartered, private, nonprofit society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific 
research.21  Specifically, the IOM acts as an advisor to the federal government, 
identifying issues of medical care, research, and education.22  Recommendations by 
the IOM traditionally carry substantial political weight in Washington, D.C.23  
Indeed, within two weeks of the release of To Err Is Human on November 29, 1999, 
Congress began relevant hearings and President Clinton ordered a government-wide 
study of the feasibility of implementing the report’s recommendations.24 
The IOM study was released as the first of a series of reports issued with the aim 
of achieving a “threshold improvement” in health care quality over the next ten 
                                                                
19See id. at 9-10. 
20Id. at 110-11. 
21IOM, supra note 3, at iii. 
22Id. 
23Pear, supra note 7. 
24Lucian L. Leape, Institute of Medicine Medial Error Figures Are Not Exaggerated, 284 
JAMA 95 (2000).  A group of that nation’s largest companies, including General Electric, 
General Motors, AT&T, and IMB have also taken action in response to the IOM’s report by 
agreeing to use their mammoth health-care buying power to press for stringent new safety 
standards at U.S. Hospitals.  See generally Barbara Martinez, Business Consortium to Launch 
Effort Seeking Higher Standards at Hospitals, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2000, at A3. 
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years.25  The Committee on Quality of Health Care in America, a subdivision of the 
IOM that conducted the study on medical error, consisted of various professionals 
from the medical, business, and academic communities.26  A sampling of those who 
sat on the panel include William C. Richardson, President and CEO of the W.K. 
Kellogg Foundation, Dr. Lucian Leape of the Harvard School of Public Health, and 
Dr. Mark Chassin of the Mount Sinai School of Medicine.27 
As outlined in the opening pages of To Err is Human, the report seeks to address 
issues related to patient safety, a subset of overall quality-related concerns, and lays 
out a national agenda for reducing errors in health care and improving patient 
safety.28  It should be noted that the IOM’s report only reflects empirical data 
concerning medical error affecting hospital patients. 29  Therefore, with more than 
half of all surgeries today occurring on an outpatient basis, the report’s scope can be 
seen as somewhat limited.30  In making its recommendations, the IOM panel drew 
largely upon research gathered in two studies:  (1) the Harvard Medical Practice 
Study, a groundbreaking report released in 1991 in which the subject of medical 
error was systematically examined through information garnered from a 1984 
hospital admissions database in New York state; and (2) a 1992 study of Colorado 
and Utah hospitals using the same methods as the 1991 Harvard study.31  Thus, many 
of the statistics mentioned in To Err is Human are extrapolated from prior research 
conducted in New York, Colorado and Utah.   
“Error” is defined by the IOM panel as “the failure of a planned action to be 
completed as intended or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim.”32  An “adverse 
event” is an injury caused by medical mismanagement rather than the underlying 
condition of the patient.33  An adverse event attributable to error is a “preventable 
adverse event.”34  While “adverse events” result from medical mismanagement, not 
all are preventable.  An example drawn from To Err is Human helps to illustrate this 
point.  If a patient has surgery and dies from pneumonia occurring after the 
operation, it is an adverse event.35  If analysis of the case later reveals that the patient 
got pneumonia because of poor hand washing or instrument cleaning techniques by 
                                                                
25IOM, supra note 3, at xi. 
26Id. at v. 
27Id. 
28Id. at 5. 
29Note, however, that the Early Offers plan, outlined infra, is not limited to inpatient 
healthcare settings. 
30See Leape, supra note 24, at 97 (arguing that the actual number of deaths from medical 
error is, if anything, more than the estimates of the IOM).   
31Clemant J. McDonald et al., Deaths Due to Medical Error are Exaggerated in Institute 
of Medicine Report, 248 JAMA 93 (2000).  
32IOM, supra note 3, at 4. 
33Id. at 28. 
34Id. 
35Id. at 4. 
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the staff, the adverse event was “preventable,” i.e. attributable to error.36  However, 
an investigation of the incident may conclude that no error occurred, and that the 
patient’s system simply reacted poorly to the surgery, indicating that the pneumonia 
was not a “preventable adverse event” and was attributable rather to the idiosyncratic 
response of the patient himself.37 
According to the IOM, the rate of preventable adverse events in the nation’s 
hospital systems is truly daunting.  The data gleaned from the 1984 Harvard study in 
New York indicate that as many as 98,000 patients may perish each year in 
American hospitals as a result of preventable adverse events.38  This estimate renders 
medical error the fifth leading cause of death in the U.S., above such other scourges 
as pneumonia, diabetes and kidney disease.39  Even by the more conservative 
estimate of 44,000 deaths per year, the amount generalized from the Colorado/Utah 
study, medical error would still rank as the eighth single leading cause of death in 
this country.40  Other striking statistics that leap out at the reader, in addition to those 
recited at the onset of this paper, include the following:   
• The costs of medical adverse events are recorded as being higher than the 
direct and indirect costs of caring for people with HIV and AIDS;41  
• Preventable medication-related adverse errors are dramatically rising:  
among medication-related outpatient deaths, there was nearly 8.5% increase 
in frequency between 1983 and 1993; amongst medication-related deaths 
occurring in hospitals, the rate increased 2.57% over the same time period;42 
• 70% of the adverse events that occur in American hospitals are preventable;   
• The most common types of these preventable errors include technical 
errors43 (44%), improper diagnosis (17%), and mistakes in the use of a drug 
(10%);44 
• In hospitals, high error rates with serious consequences are most likely in 
intensive care units, operating rooms and emergency departments;45 
• The contributions of complexity and technology to these error rates is 
indicated by the higher rates of errors that occur in the more technical 
surgical specialties of vascular surgery, cardiac surgery, and neurosurgery.46 
                                                                
36Id. 
37IOM, supra note 3, at 4. 
38Id. at 1. 
39Weiss, supra note 10. 
40IOM, supra note 3, at 30. 
41Id. at 27. 
42Id. at 32-33. 
43This term is undefined in the IOM report. 
44IOM, supra note 3, at 36. 
45Id.  For a discussion of the large number of medical errors committed in the intensive 
care unit at San Francisco General Hospital in the course of an average month, see generally 
Richard Horton, In the Danger Zone, N.Y. REV., Aug. 10, 2000, at 30 (reviewing JOHN F. 
MURRAY, INTENSIVE CARE: A DOCTOR’S JOURNAL (2000)). 
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Critics of the IOM’s study point to the panel’s alleged abuse of the data collected 
by the Harvard study.47  In particular, some argue that the IOM did not distinguish 
carefully between those deaths attributable to “preventable adverse events” and those 
fatalities resulting from mere adverse events, which, as was noted earlier, may not 
have resulted from actual error or even been preventable in the first place.48  
However, in rebutting those who charge that the report “exaggerated” the medical 
errors problem, panel member Dr. Lucian Leape points to the fact that the original 
Harvard research took into account only hospital patients.49  Dr. Leape also argues 
that with more than half of all surgeries now occurring on an outpatient basis, the 
IOM report, if anything, underestimates the total number of medical errors.50  Indeed, 
countless other cases of medical errors are committed in contexts other than 
hospitals, such as nursing homes.  For instance, according to a study by the 
University of Massachusetts Medical School, an estimated 350,000 medication errors 
occur in U.S. nursing homes each year, more than half of them preventable.51 
As mentioned previously, the IOM report stresses the need to shift the focus from 
blaming individuals for past errors to creating a better process of medical service by 
building safer care systems.52  Contrary to this theme, when asked in one survey 
about possible solutions to prevent medical mistakes, respondents rated as most 
effective “keeping health care professionals with bad track records from providing 
                                                          
46IOM, supra note 3, at 36.  These and many more alarming statistics are reported in detail 
in Chapter 2 of To Err Is Human.  See id. at 26-49. 
47See McDonald, supra note 31, at 93. See also Rodney A. Hayward & Timothy P. Hofer, 
Estimating Hospital Deaths Due to Medical Errors, 4 JAMA 415 (2001) (questioning the 
statistical validity of the Harvard study and estimating on their own the rate of deaths 
attributable to preventable errors as much lower than the Harvard study). The AMA study, like 
the Harvard study, showed a 6.0% chance that patients would have left the hospital alive had 
optimal care been given.  Id. at 415.  When Hayward and Hofer considered the three-month 
prognosis and adjusted for the variability and skewed quality of reviewers’ ratings, however, 
the chance that patients would have left the hospital alive had optimal care been given dropped 
to 0.5%.  Id.  See also Study Disputes Report on Fatal Medical Errors, WASH. POST, July 25, 
2001, at A10.  Hayward and Hofer summarize their findings as follows: 
[W]e found that our physician reviewers often reported medical errors and frequently 
reported deaths as being preventable by better care (at a rate similar to previous 
studies). However, three caveats were identified that have implications for preventable 
deaths: (1) the probability that the error actually caused the death was often considered 
to be low; (2) reviewer assessment of errors had poor reliability and was usually 
skewed; and (3) the underlying short-term prognosis of the person who died was often 
judged to be very limited.   
Hayward, supra, at 420. 
48Rick Weiss, Report on Medical Errors Called Erroneous; Fueling Debate, Researchers 
Challenge Data Indicating Thousands Die Because of Mistakes, WASH. POST, July 5, 2000, at 
AO2. 
49Leape, supra note 24, at 97. 
50Id.  
51Findings: 350,000 Drug Errors, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2000, at A12. 
52IOM, supra note 3, at 5. 
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care” (75%), and “better training of health care professionals” (69%).53  The IOM, 
however, faults the current overall medical care system itself as the primary cause of 
preventable adverse events in the U.S.54  The healthcare system has grown so large, 
complex, cluttered, and fragmented that it takes nothing less than perfection for 
physicians and other personnel to complete the process without slipping at some 
point.  For example, according to Dr. Donald Berwick, president of the Institute of 
Healthcare Improvement and one of the authors of To Err is Human, the vast 
majority of medical mistakes are committed not by bad actors, but by good doctors 
trying to do the right thing, working under conditions that do not account for the fact 
that they are only human.55    
The IOM is not the only party to call for a greater recognition of the complexity 
of the system and the inevitability of physician error.   Michael Millenson, author of 
a recent book on medical quality, remarks that the “number one cause of medical 
mistakes is not incompetence, but confusion.”56  In his words, most treatment-related 
errors are caused by poorly designed systems that lack “safeguards to protect against 
anything less than human perfection.”57  Dr. Sherwin Nuland, professor of surgery at 
the Yale School of Medicine and author of a number of widely read books on 
medical care,58 emphasizes in a Wall Street Journal commentary published soon after 
the release of the IOM’s findings that able and well-meaning personnel are trapped, 
“caught up in a system filled with the possibility of misadventure, where the smallest 
error can have catastrophic consequences.”59    
                                                                
53Id. at 43. 
54Id. at 4-5.  (“Building safety in processes of care is a more effective way to reduce errors 
than blaming individuals.”).   
55Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Do No Harm:  Breaking Down Medicine’s Culture of Silence, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 5, 1999, at D1.  
56Preventing Fatal Medical Errors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999, at A30. 
57Id. 
58See generally SHERWIN B. NULAND, THE MYSTERIES WITHIN: A SURGEON REFLECTS ON 
MEDICAL MYTHS (2000); HOW WE LIVE (1998); THE WISDOM OF THE BODY (1997); HOW WE 
DIE: REFLECTIONS ON LIFE’S FINAL CHAPTER (1994); MEDICINE: THE ART OF HEALING (1992); 
DOCTORS: THE BIOGRAPHY OF MEDICINE (1988).  
59Sherwin B. Nuland, The Hazards of Hospitalization, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1999, at A22.  
For example, experts believe that of the hundreds of cases of wrong-site surgery occurring in 
the U.S. each year, the vast majority are not due to the fault of any single medical professional 
but instead are the result of slight errors committed by many different individuals at different 
stages of the caregiving process and systems in place that do not prevent those mistakes from 
doing harm.  See Jennifer Steinhauer, So, the Brain Tumor’s on the Left, Right?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 1, 2001, at 27.  Horrific instances of wrong-site surgery have made headlines across the 
nation.  In New York state alone there were some twenty-eight cases of wrong-site injury in 
the year 2000.  Id.  Included in these cases were the following nightmarish episodes:  two 
doctors were accused of operating on the wrong side of a patient’s brain; one was found guilty 
of performing surgery on the wrong section of a person’s spinal cord; another lost his license 
for (among other things) removing the left kidney of a seventy-nine-year-old man who had a 
cancerous mass in his right kidney; and another performed surgery on a healthy knee, rather 
than the injured one.  Id. 
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In fact, to a large degree, patients and physicians might be considered victims of 
the extraordinary successes achieved by biomedical science in the past forty years; 
successes that have, in turn, generated today’s ultra-complex system of health care.60  
For example, diagnostic and therapeutic methods that were relatively simple until the 
mid 1950s have become increasingly effective, but, in the process, grown 
increasingly complicated and sometimes risky to implement.61  The operating room, 
in particular, for all its miracles, is on occasion corollarially error-prone due to its 
inherent makeup in today’s high-tech hospitals.62  Surgeons at the most 
technologically advanced hospitals are tempted to rush new techniques into clinical 
use before appropriate testing has been done.63  All surgeries or drug treatments, no 
matter how technologically sound or groundbreaking, are not without significant side 
effects on the body beyond those that are intended.64  Keeping complications to a 
minimum demands a “delicately balanced coordination of multiple influences, every 
one of which depends on decisions made by fallible human beings.”65  And in a 
fragmented system, in which patients are often passed from one medical professional 
to the next, physicians often do not have complete information about treatments 
prescribed for their patients by other physicians.66   
For instance, in any given day a single hospital patient may deal with a number 
of medical professionals—a nephrologist,67 an infectious disease specialist, a 
pulmonologist,68 a cardiologist,69 a gastroenterologist,70 and three or four members of 
the department of diagnostic imaging, each of whom is a ‘superspecialist’ in a 
distinct branch of that respective discipline.71  With so many steps and so many 
people involved in every aspect of care, the possibilities for error multiply, and small 
lapses can quickly escalate into major tragedies.  To quote Dr. Nuland, “If ever there 
were an example of chaos theory in action, [the modern hospital] is it.”72 
                                                                





65Nuland, supra note 59. 
66Pear, supra note 7.   
67A physician who specializes in dealing with kidneys. 
68A physician who specializes in dealing with the lungs. 
69A physician who specializes in dealing with the heart. 
70A physician who deals with disorders of the digestive system. 
71Nuland, supra note 59. 
72Id.  Along with the increased potential for complications due to technological 
complexities, Dr. Nuland has noted an additional problem physicians face:  the often near-
divine capacity for healing that society ascribes to doctors.  See Gustav Niebuhr, Believer and 
Skeptic See Spirituality in Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2000, at A19.  According to 
Nuland, many physicians themselves come to believe in the image of the divine doctor.  Id.  
This superhuman ideal may explain why doctors (and patients) expect perfection in the 
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Having determined that the high volume of medical error in this country is due 
primarily to systemic error, the IOM panel advances various formal 
recommendations to address the situation.  For example, to make significant 
improvements in patient safety, a highly visible center is needed, which will 
establish goals for safety, develop a research agenda, define prototype safety 
systems, develop and disseminate tools and methods for educating consumers about 
patient safety, and recommend additional improvements as needed.73  To that end, 
the IOM study recommends that Congress create a new federal agency, a Center for 
Patient Safety, to set detailed national goals for reducing errors.74  The agency would 
set and communicate priorities, monitor progress in achieving these goals, direct 
resources toward areas of need, and bring visibility to important issues.75  In short, 
the Center for Patient Safety would seek to develop and apply the knowledge that 
would deliver health care to patients more safely. 
The report also stresses the importance of creating an environment that 
encourages hospitals and other medical care organizations to identify errors, evaluate 
causes and take appropriate actions to improve performance in the future.76  
Reporting systems are one mechanism that can enhance the medical community’s 
understanding of errors and the underlying factors that contribute to them.77  
Accordingly, the IOM recommends that Congress require health care providers to 
inform state governments of any medical errors that result in serious harm or death to 
patients.78  This mandatory reporting requirement would apply to hospitals only 
during the trial years, but then later to other institutional and ambulatory care 
delivery settings.79  The IOM believes that the Center for Patient Safety should then 
receive and analyze reports from state governments to identify persistent safety 
issues that require more intensive analysis.80  As indicated above,81 the panel 
contends that reports on medical errors that cause serious harm to patients should be 
available to the public.82 
The IOM goes on to recommend that minor medical errors not resulting in 
serious injuries or death be collected in a voluntary, confidential database that would 
                                                          
delivery of health care.  See id.  The pressure to live up to this godlike perception may be an 
additional reason why doctors are reluctant to admit committing medical errors, even though, 
in actuality, mistakes are inevitable in today’s highly complex system of health care delivery.  
See Nuland, supra note 59.   
73IOM, supra note 3, at 7.  
74Id.  
75Id. at 6-7. 
76Id. at 8. See also infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
77IOM, supra note 3, at 8. 
78Id. at 9. 
79Id. 
80Id. 
81See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
82See IOM, supra note 3, at 10. 
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not be available to the public for review.83  Such confidential reporting systems could 
be set up both within individual health care organizations as well as for collaborative 
efforts among health care organizations.84  The IOM also urges that Congress pass 
legislation to restrict use in litigation of data related to patient safety and quality 
improvement collected in these voluntary databases and analyzed by health care 
organizations for internal use or shared with others solely for purposes of improving 
overall safety and quality.85  The hope is that by reducing health care providers’ legal 
exposure and the risk of lawsuits, doctors, hospitals, and others may be more open 
about their errors, and thus give the medical community a chance to learn from their 
own mistakes.86 
These two new reporting systems would operate along with existing national 
systems already in place, such as the National Practitioner Data Bank.  Congress 
created this federal database in 1986 to afford information on incompetent 
practitioners who often skip from state to state without accountability.87  The 
database lists medical malpractice payments by physicians as well as state 
disciplinary actions taken against 135,000 of the nation’s 650,000 medical doctors. 88  
                                                                
83See id. at 110. 
84Id. 
85Id.   
86Weiss, supra note 10.  In 1997, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs instituted a 
reporting system similar to the programs proposed by the IOM.  See Robert Pear, Report 
Outing Medical Errors in V.A. Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1999, at A1.  Department 
officials actively train and encourage medical professionals to abide by the reporting 
requirements.  Id.  Along the same lines as the IOM’s proposed confidentiality requirement, 
physicians are given assurances that they will not be punished internally for acknowledging 
mistakes committed in the care of patients.  Id.  In addition, the Department has also created 
its own National Center for Patient Safety which analyzes reports of reported medical 
mistakes, looks for patterns and trends, and suggests corrective actions.  Id.  The number of 
reported errors since has been high since the system took effect:  in less than two years, almost 
3000 medical errors were documented, causing more than 700 patient deaths.  Id.  Because of 
these reports, health care executives within the Department are now receiving useful 
information about problems that need to be fixed and have begun the process of overhauling 
the system to combat the number of errors, and in the process, save the lives of America’s 
veterans.  See Pear, supra.  But the extent to which such a program would in the long run 
excite medical malpractice claims, especially if instituted for the general public, is unknown. 
87Must Mistakes Happen?, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1999, at A38.  Also, state governments 
may already have some reporting scheme in place.  New York, for example, requires hospitals 
to inform the state government whenever an unintended adverse and undesirable development 
in an individual patient’s condition occurs.  Jennifer Steinhauer, Hospitals in City Faulted by 
State for Failing to Report Many Errors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001, at B1.  The New York 
system was designed to enable state officials to better find the cause of medical errors and thus 
improve the state’s medical systems.  See id.  But the New York plan has proven faulty, 
plagued by underreporting and a reluctance by many hospitals to expose themselves by 
reporting medical errors to the state reporting system.  Id.  The Early Offers plan, described 
infra, should help to make medical providers more willing to report errors to state and federal 
databanks.   
88Sandra G. Boodman, The Right to Know Still Trying to Open Database on Doctors, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2000, HEALTH (Magazine), at 13. 
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However, due to pressure by many medical groups, in particular the American 
Medical Association, Congress has refrained from opening the system to the public.89  
Consequently, the National Practitioner Data Bank is seen by many as an abject 
failure, citing, for example, the case of Dr. Michael Swango:  In September, 2000, 
Swango confessed to killing four patients, attempting to kill four more, and 
committing five felonies during the span of his career as a practicing physician in 
Ohio, Illinois, Virginia, South Dakota, and New York.90  Although he was 
investigated for murder at the Ohio State University Hospital in 1984, and convicted 
of poisoning fellow hospital employees at a hospital in Illinois in 1985, events that 
took place some eight years before he committed his murders in New York, 
Swango’s name never appeared in the data bank.91   
On this issue of openness, one might question why the IOM recommends the 
imposition of a confidentiality rule to protect reports concerning medical errors that 
lead to less severe patient harm but not in cases where the mistakes lead to serious 
injury or death.  After all, studies suggest that a plaintiff’s degree of disability, rather 
than a provider’s negligence, is what most significantly correlates with tort recovery 
in medical malpractice suits.92  Thus, given that plaintiffs are probably more likely to 
file malpractice claims in cases where the harm is most extensive, might not the IOM 
include a confidentiality rule in its mandatory reporting program where physicians 
and other medical personnel would most need the protection?  Indeed, medical 
professionals probably already have less reason to fear a lawsuit in cases of only 
minor injury even without the protection of a confidentiality rule, since medical 
malpractice cases are rarely brought unless serious injuries are involved; the energy 
and expense for claimant’s counsel in bringing a malpractice suit are simply not 
justified unless the damages are very substantial.  A confidentiality requirement, 
then, might thus seem more appropriate as a feature of the mandatory reporting 
system than as part of the voluntary program. 
Interestingly, the IOM does not address this inconsistency as to reporting, but 
points to America’s aviation industry as a good example of how reporting systems 
with less emphasis on fault-finding can lead to vast safety improvements.93  Prior to 
World War II, airplane accidents, like medical mistakes today, were viewed 
primarily as individually caused; safety meant motivating people to “be safe.”94  But 
during the war, military leaders began to realize that planning a broader, systemic 
approach in operating aircraft was vital.95  Thus, the military worked both during the 
war and in the years subsequent to improve its safety systems through the formation 
                                                                
89Id.  See also AMA Denounces Databank Effort, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2000, at A17. 
90James B. Stewart, Doctors Who Kill, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2000, at B7. 
91Id. 
92Jeffrey O’Connell & James F. Neale, HMOs, Cost Containment, and Early Offers: New 
Malpractice Threats and a Proposed Reform, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 287, 295 
(1998). 
93IOM, supra note 3, at 71-72. 
94Id. at 71. 
95See id. at 71-72. 
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of several aviation safety centers which took into account that in complicated 
systems such as aviation human beings may be naturally prone to err.96   
Building on the successful experience and knowledge of military aviation, 
civilian aviation has also implemented programs aimed at setting and enforcing 
standards, accident investigation, incident reporting, and research for continuous 
improvement.  For example, the Federal Aviation Administration [hereinafter 
“FAA”], part of the Department of Transportation, is charged explicitly with 
ensuring airplane passenger safety.97  Similar to how the IOM-recommended Center 
for Patient Safety would function, the National Transportation Safety Board 
[hereinafter “NTSB”], an independent federal agency, conducts investigations of 
aviation accidents and issues recommendations to the FAA for regulatory action.98  
But significantly, in further encouraging open and honest discussion between the 
government and those parties involved in an airplane accident, the Federal Aviation 
Act provides that no litigant may use any part of a report by the NTSB relating to an 
accident as evidence in a civil trial.99 
Also cited in the IOM’s recommendations is ‘incident reporting’ (defined as an 
occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft that affects or could affect the 
safety of operations) conducted through the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration Aviation Safety Reporting System [hereinafter “ASRS”].100  ASRS is 
a voluntary, confidential reporting system used to identify hazards and latent system 
deficiencies in order to eliminate or mitigate them.101  Since reports are submitted to 
ASRS by individuals confidentially, any additional information obtained through 
                                                                
96See id. 
97Id. at 72. 
98IOM, supra note 3, at 72. 
9949 U.S.C. § 1154(b) (1994).  See Protectus Alpha Navigation Co. v. N. Pac. Grain 
Growers, 767 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that NTSB reports are excludable under 
federal statute to the extent that they express agency views or conclusions as to probable cause 
of accident); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Frank, 227 F. Supp. 948 (D. Conn. 1964) (holding that, in 
an action for damages, all evaluation, opinion, and conclusion evidence must be excluded 
from parts of investigative reports made by subcommittee of Civil Aeronautics Board—now 
the NTSB—that might otherwise be admissible as evidence).  But see Mullan v. Quickie 
Aircraft Corp., 797 F.2d 845 (10th Cir. 1986) (stating factual portions of NTSB reports may 
be admitted as evidence in an action for damages and only the use of those portions regarding 
proximate cause is prohibited, with the result that in an action by a consumer for personal 
injuries resulting from the crash of an aircraft constructed by the consumer from a kit sold by 
the defendant manufacturer, the consumer’s expert witness may properly rely on factual 
portions of the NTSB report, and the fact that the consumer’s expert came to conclusions 
which were the same or similar to those of the NTSB investigators does not support the 
inference that the consumer’s expert relied on the NTSB report in an impermissible way); 
Kline v. Martin, 345 F. Supp. 31 (E.D. Va. 1972) (holding that, during discovery depositions 
in an action for wrongful death of a passenger in an aircraft which crashed, an Air Safety 
Investigator who conducted a federal investigation at the scene of the crash was required to 
answer questions so long as the answers did not include opinions as to the ultimate conclusion 
of the cause of the accident).    
100IOM, supra note 3, at 72.  
101Id. at 95. 
2000-01] MORE HIPPOCRATES, LESS HYPOCRISY 35 
follow-up interviews with reporters is also maintained anonymously in the 
database.102  Information garnered from the reporting systems has led to the 
successful research and development of improved safety systems concerning the 
ways aircraft are operated in the U.S.103 
In light of the effectiveness of these reporting systems in the field of aviation, the 
IOM finds that, in order for its own proposed reporting scheme to be successful, a 
“more conducive [legal] environment is needed to encourage health care 
professionals and organizations to identify, analyze and report errors without threat 
of litigation and without compromising patients’ legal rights.”104  If physicians, 
hospitals, and insurers are potentially putting themselves in legal jeopardy each time 
a mistake is reported, it is unlikely that reporting systems will be successful in 
encouraging the reporting of medical errors in the first place, thereby thwarting 
efforts to learn from them and thereby improve patient safety.  Thus, the IOM urges 
that legal reform is necessary in order to ensure that any reporting system, voluntary 
or otherwise, be effective.105 
III.  THE NEED FOR TORT REFORM  
This section discusses in more detail the shortcomings of the current tort system 
with respect to the IOM’s recommendations.  It highlights how the current tort 
regime thwarts proposals offered by the IOM to reduce error.  In addition, it aims to 
show the current tort medical malpractice tort regime is largely unsuccessful when it 
comes to compensating injured patients who are often in desperate need of swift 
relief.   
At the outset, the sheer nature of the often bitter adversarial legal process 
inevitably discourages forthcoming candor by litigants.  A new book entitled Legal 
Blame by law professor Neil Feigenson illustrates at great length how the manner in 
which personal injury cases are prepared and litigated is really at odds with the IOM 
report’s emphasis on systemic causes of medical adverse events.106  Instead of 
seeking to uncover the systemic origins of accidents which, as alluded to earlier, are 
multi-causal in today’s highly technological society,107 personal injury litigation 
distorts accidents as not only mono-causal but also paints them melodramatically by 
seeking a histrionically reprehensible causal flaw on the part of some single 
individual, to the point of not only ignoring but repressing more complex multi-
causal factors.108  Relying on an exhaustive examination of both scholarly literature 
                                                                
102Id. 
103Id. at 72-73.  The IOM emphasizes that through the combined efforts of the 
aforementioned federal oversight bodies, there have been dramatic declines in the number of 
airplane accidents and fatalities through the years.  See id. at 5, 72-73.  For example, between 
1990 and 1994, the U.S. airline fatality rate was less than one-third the rate experienced in the 
mid-twentieth century.  IOM, supra note 3, at 5. 
104Id. at 10. 
105Id. 110-11. 
106NEIL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: HOW JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS, 
(2000). 
107See supra notes 56-72 and accompanying text. 
108FEIGENSON, supra note 106. 
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and actual trial transcripts, Feigenson finds that complexity repels jurors, and even 
judges.109  Triers of fact are thus much more likely to find liability (or conversely to 
reject it) if they can be made to focus on a “bad guy” (either plaintiff or defendant), 
as opposed to intricate, interconnected processes or programs that may, in the 
particular case, have been amiss.110 
Although the IOM believes that the systematic reporting and tracking of safety 
problems is an important approach to the reduction of medical errors, all reporting 
systems, especially in the simplistic blame game culture documented by Feigenson, 
face two bedrock issues:  (1) how to motivate health care practitioners and others to 
candidly (one is tempted to say guilelessly) submit pertinent information, and (2) 
how to maintain the reported data in a systematic way that is useful to medical 
practitioners in their efforts to learn from past mistakes.111  Since reporting systems 
may contain information useful to plaintiffs’ counsel in their relentless and often 
simplistic search for a “bad guy” to blame in a medical malpractice action, fear of 
legal discoverability or other involvement in the legal process clearly contributes to 
underreporting of errors.112  Plaintiffs might obtain reporting information from the 
                                                                
109See id.   
110See id.  The irony is that Feigenson, while not only acknowledging but demonstrating 
the resultant distortions, ends up supporting the personal injury system and admiring the skill 
of counsel in exploiting it, and jurors in trying to deal with it.  With friends like that, who 
needs enemies?  A review of Feigenson’s book is forthcoming by Jeffrey O’Connell and 
Joseph Baldwin.   
111IOM, supra note 3, at 112. 
112Id. at 127.  There is widespread belief among health care professionals that the current 
legal climate creates immense disincentives against candid disclosure. According to Richard 
Davidson, president of the American Hospital Association [hereinafter “AHA”], “[t]he idea 
that a mandatory reporting system is going to change behavior is naïve at best. You need to 
focus on making a cultural change in hospitals, to promote open discussion of errors, and 
that’s not possible if some plaintiff’s attorney is climbing on your back.”  As quoted in Melissa 
Chiang, Promoting Patient Safety: Creating a Workable Reporting System, 18 YALE J. ON 
REG. 383, 391 (2001) (citing Robert Pear, Clinton to Order Steps to Reduce Medical Mistakes, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2000, at A1).  Similarly, a spokesman for the AHA states, “[w]e have to 
create an environment in which we learn from failure.  This cannot be achieved in an 
environment of punishment or fear of legal prosecution for doctors, nurses and other 
caregivers who step forward after an unfortunate mistake is made.”  Chiang, supra at 391 (as 
quoted in Medical Errors: AMA Not in Favor of Mandatory Reporting, AM. HEALTH LINE, 
Dec. 14, 1999, LEXIS, Medical & Healthcare Library).  Health care providers do not believe 
that obligatory reports are the answer; they suggest that the best way to encourage reporting is 
to remove legal disincentives.  Id. at 392 (citing Robert Pear, U.S. Health Officials Reject Plan 
to Report Medical Mistakes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2000, at A14).  See also id. at 394-95, n.56 
(“In the long run, what is in the best interest of patient safety, to punish and inhibit the 
reporting of errors, or to encourage error reporting in a nonpunitive system and let individuals 
go unpunished for making errors?  Although I say ‘going unpunished,’ this is actually a 
misnomer, because there is always self-punishment. . . . [I]n the long run, . . . it is safer to 
know what is going on, so that you can attempt to fix it, than to punish employees for making 
errors.”) (quoting Neil M. Davis, Nonpunitive Medication Error Reporting Systems: Tough to 
Accept but Safest for Patients, 31 HOSP. PHARMACY 1036 (1996)). 
Fear of liability is often cited as an explanation for practitioners’ failure to report.  See 
Chiang, supra, at 396 (citing Hearing on Medical Errors Before the Subcomm. on Health of 
the House Ways and Means Comm., 106th Cong. (2000)) (commenting that the “fear of 
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three components of a reporting system:  (1) the original reporter; (2) the personnel 
who receive, investigate, or analyze the reports; and (3) the data itself residing in the 
reporting bank.113  A database that holds such relevant information as the patient’s 
name, attending physician, date of accident, and institution in which the harm 
allegedly occurred will be of utmost interest to a plaintiff involved in the case 
reported.  But even if the data are identified by institution or physician, but not by 
patient, the information may still be useful to a plaintiff in claims against the 
institution itself in such causes of action as “negligent supervision” or “negligent 
                                                          
litigation is a significant impediment [to reporting] for the majority of health care providers”).  
See also David J. Cullen et al., The Incident Reporting System Does Not Detect Adverse Drug 
Events, 21 JT. COMM’N. J. QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 541, 547 (1995); Marshall B. Kapp, 
Medical Error Versus Malpractice, 1 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 751, 765 (1997) 
(“[P]hysicians’ legal anxieties serve as a powerful barrier to the implementation of a concerted 
strategy  to identify, prevent, mitigate, and correct . . . errors.”); Brian A. Liang, The Legal 
System and Patient Safety: Changing a Divergent Course: The Relationship between 
Malpractice Litigation and Human Errors, 91 ANESTHESIOLOGY 609, 610 (1999) (arguing that 
potential discovery of information in tort suits “chill[s] reporting of medical error”); J. Bryan 
Sexton et al., Error, Stress, and Teamwork in Medicine and Aviation: Cross Sectional Survey, 
320 BRIT. MED. J. 745, 747 (2000) (reporting that 71% of 1033 British practitioner participants 
find it difficult to acknowledge mistakes because of the threat of malpractice suits). 
Furthermore, it has been empirically found that providers do not respond to mandatory 
systems.  See Chiang, supra, at 393 (“At least a third of states had mandatory systems in place 
at the time of the IOM report. Despite their ‘mandatory’ nature, ‘underreporting . . . plague[d] 
all programs.’”) (quoting IOM, supra note 3, at 22). For example, in Pennsylvania, which 
requires reports for “gross” (i.e., severe) events such as deaths due to injuries, suicides or 
malnutrition, the Department of Health received only one report for the one-year period that 
ended in June 1999.  Id. (citing Andrea Gerlin, Philadelphia’s Largest Hospitals Failed to 
Report Medical Errors, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 22, 2000, at A1). Philadelphia’s hospitals alone 
probably encountered thousands of reportable errors.  The story in Pennsylvania is not unique.  
North Carolina’s mandatory reporting system received only fifteen reports in its first year and 
Colorado received only seventeen reports in two years.  Id. (citing Charles Billings, Incident 
Reporting Systems in Medicine and Experience with the Aviation Safety Reporting System, in 
A TALE OF TWO STORIES: CONTRASTING VIEWS OF PATIENT SAFETY, app. B, at 55 (1998)).  See 
also id. at 394 (“[I]n some form, in one way or another, all incident reporting becomes 
voluntary.  It either becomes voluntary because of inertia on the part of reporters, or it 
becomes voluntary because of constraints within the establishment and the environment, or it 
becomes voluntary because hospitals decide that they are not required to report this particular 
event because of the fine print in that particular incident reporting regulation or statute.”) 
(quoting Charles Billings, supra, at 55). 
For a recent report on the concept of “root cause analysis,” see Janet Conley, RCA 101: 
Introduction to Root Cause Analysis, LOSS MINIMIZER, July 13, 2001, at 1.  The Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations recently issued a new standard that 
requires hospital management and risk managers to investigate not only a sentinel event—”any 
unexpected occurrence involving death or serious physical or psychological injury, or the risk 
thereof,” but also the root causes of all actual and potential injuries, with an eye toward total 
candor in rooting out causes of past and future iatrogenic injury.  Id. at 2.  While Conley’s 
article emphasizes the importance of candor in reporting, it acknowledges the incompatibility 
of fear of litigation and candid reporting.  See id. (“The focus on individual blame and 
subsequent individualized correction and retribution cannot continue to exist in an 
environment truly committed to improving patient care.”). 
113IOM, supra note 3, at 113. 
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credentialing.”114  Even data that has been cleared of all personal and organizational 
identification could still be used to prove the “causation” elements of certain types of 
negligence actions.  For example, information in the database might show that 
injuries similar to the ones sustained by the plaintiff were caused by the same 
mechanism as the reported event, thereby demonstrating causation.  Or a plaintiff’s 
lawyer might use the anonymous information in the databank to show a defendant-
physician’s breach of the duty of reasonable care toward the plaintiff-patient by 
pointing out that that the defendant-physician had reason to know of the risks posed 
by a certain process or device based on information in the reporting system 
databank.115   
The authors of To Err Is Human contend that there are two avenues available to 
protect each of the three components of a reporting system from use by a plaintiff’s 
attorney in a lawsuit:  the enactment of new laws that prevent pretrial discovery of 
reported data, and so-called practical methods that would render the reporter 
unidentifiable or the data unhelpful to the plaintiff.116  In analyzing the first avenue, 
the enactment of laws aimed at preventing discovery of reported information, one 
need look no further than to the laws of evidence to note the inadequacies of the 
current legal regime in supporting the aims of the IOM’s reporting systems:  Most 
often, the question of whether a plaintiff can obtain access to reported data or have 
such information admitted as evidence at trial depends on the general rules of 
evidence and civil procedure of the particular state in which the malpractice claim is 
filed.117  The basic legal principal governing whether evidence can be admitted by a 
plaintiff into the record at a civil trial is the rule of “relevance.”118  Most states’ rules 
of evidence comport with the standard of relevance used in the federal court system:  
evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency” to make any element of the cause of 
action in question more or less likely.119  Moreover, trial judges are accorded broad 
discretion in judging whether an item of evidence is “relevant,” as they make these 
determinations on a case-by-case basis.120  In fact, practically speaking, a piece of 
evidence is relevant to a particular case if the judge says it is, unless there is no 
arguable basis at all for its relevance.121 
Information on errors could be relevant to a malpractice lawsuit in at least three 
ways.  First, if the information recorded in the database pertains to the particular case 
                                                                
114Id. at 112. 
115Id. at 112-13.  The problems of underreporting and fear of litigation would arguably 
only be compounded by a decision to open up the National Practitioner Data Bank to the 
public, which is periodically urged by legislators and public advocacy groups.  See, e.g., 
Prepared Testimony of the Honorable Fred Upton Before the House Commerce Committee 
Subcommittee of Oversight on Oversight & Investigations, FED. NEWS SERV., Mar. 1, 2000. 
116IOM, supra note 3, at 113. 
117Id. 
118See GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 2.1 (3d ed. 1996). 
119IOM, supra note 3, at 114. 
120Id. 
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2000-01] MORE HIPPOCRATES, LESS HYPOCRISY 39 
in dispute, every piece of data would be undoubtedly relevant.122  Second, data about 
similar occurrences to the case in dispute could be relevant in lawsuits that allege not 
merely one negligent occurrence, but negligence in a practitioner’s engaging in a 
certain activity at all.123  Third, reported information on similar occurrences might 
also be relevant in showing certain elements of the malpractice action, such as 
causation.124  For example, if there were a dispute whether a particular 
instrumentality could have caused an injury, evidence that the same instrument 
caused similar injuries in other cases would be relevant.125 
Furthermore, the potential for pretrial discovery of data concerning medical 
errors is even greater than already indicated above.  Generally, the “relevance” 
standard that most state courts use in allowing a plaintiff access to discovery 
materials is whether the information in question could lead to admissible evidence at 
the subsequent trial.126  Indeed, relevance for discovery purposes is broadly and 
liberally construed; if there is doubt about relevance, judges will generally permit 
discovery.127  Thus, a report of a medical error that might not be admissible at trial 
could still be discoverable by a plaintiff and could direct the plaintiff toward other 
relevant facts needed to prove his case at trial. 
Thus, in general, state rules regarding evidence admissible at trial and 
information open to discovery indicate that plaintiffs in a medical malpractice action 
can readily obtain information on medical errors recorded in databanks open to the 
public.  So long as information stored in the error databases can be used in litigation 
against physicians and hospitals, it seems inevitable that fear of legal exposure will 
cause the number of cases recorded to severely underrepresent the actual number of 
medical mistakes taking place.128  The panel argues, however, that the creation of a 
national peer review privilege is one promising source of legal protection for data on 
medical errors.129  Currently, every state except New Jersey statutorily protects from 
discovery various records and deliberations of peer review committees.130  These 
statutes vary greatly from state to state, however.  Some states have specific 
requirements for what qualifies as a peer review committee under the terms of the 
relevant statue.131  For example, some states restrict the privilege to in-hospital 
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128Id. at 112. 
129See IOM, supra note 3, at 10.  Recall that the IOM only recommends protecting 
information concerning errors that do not lead to serious injury or death; the IOM recommends 
that information on errors resulting in serious injury or death should be fully accessible to the 
general public.  See supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text. 
130IOM, supra note 3, at 119. 
131See id. at 119-20 
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committees or committees of professional societies.132  But many statutes do not 
cover collaborations among institutions even if all are within an integrated delivery 
system, and no states have laws that expressly cover systems or collaborations that 
reach beyond state lines.133  To compensate for such shortcomings, the IOM formally 
recommends that Congress pass federal legislation to provide peer review 
protections to all data related to patient safety and quality improvement that are 
collected in voluntary reporting databases and analyzed by health care organizations 
for internal use or shared with others solely for purposes of improving safety and 
quality.134   
Although peer review information might qualify for this privilege, data from 
databases might nevertheless be discoverable under some circumstances.135  For 
example, even in those states that have enacted peer review statutes similar to the 
federal model recommended by the IOM, reported information may not be protected 
for causes of action for “negligent supervision” or “negligent credentialing by an 
institution” against hospitals and other medical centers, because the performance of 
the peer review process is itself what is at issue in such claims.136  Indeed, as the 
IOM panel members point out, some state medical licensing boards have already 
gained access to peer review information for disciplinary purposes.137  Moreover, 
some state court systems compromise on the protection offered by peer review 
statutes by conducting a balancing test in determining whether a plaintiff should 
have access to facts contained in peer review documents.  In such tests, the court 
balances how crucial the need of the relevant information is to the plaintiff against 
how much trouble and expense it imposes on the defendant.138  In addition, many 
state statutes, as well as the IOM’s recommended federal statute, that prevent a 
plaintiff from compelling a member of a medical institution’s peer review committee 
to testify in a lawsuit do not prevent a member of a peer review board from testifying 
voluntarily.139 
There are thus loopholes even in the statutory protections recommended by the 
IOM.  Furthermore, the IOM study does not even address the problem of how to 
encourage medical personnel who might have committed an error that has led to a 
patient’s death or serious injury to report their mistakes, as they would be required to 
do if the IOM recommendations were to take effect.  In point of fact, more than 
reporting systems is needed to provide adequate incentives to doctors and others to 
report any action that might have resulted in injury to a patient.  As the IOM authors 
themselves suggest, the contentiousness and myopia that dominate our present tort 
system must give way to a new legal culture that seeks to promote patient safety 
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rather than to pinpoint blame.140  Otherwise, the goal of promoting honest and 
accurate reporting of medical errors remains out of reach.141   
The current medical malpractice tort regime not only fails in promoting the 
IOM’s goal of decreasing the rate of medical errors in accord with the IOM 
recommendations, but also often fails to live up to the tort system’s own prime goal 
in this context:  justly compensating victims of medical error.142  According to a 
Harvard study, only one in eight negligently injured plaintiffs files a tort claim, and 
only one in sixteen negligently injured plaintiffs is eventually compensated.143  Even 
if a victim is successful in accessing the tort system, the average tort lawsuit reaches 
trial years after it is filed.144  An injured plaintiff’s financial needs may often be most 
acute during this waiting period, as lost wages, medical bills, and low morale begin 
to take their toll.  Whether or not the case eventually makes it to trial, studies show 
that tort law’s transaction costs consume half or more of all the dollars that 
defendants pay in tort settlements and verdicts.145  Indeed, up to forty percent of any 
award is immediately diverted to plaintiff’s own attorney’s fees.146   
As Harvard Law School Professor Paul Weiler notes, when it comes to just 
compensation the current malpractice regime “has major flaws,” as tort benefits are 
“doled out in a rather arbitrary manner to some—but not most—deserving victims, 
and also to those . . . who are not even ‘deserving’ within tort law’s fault-based 
frame of reference.”147  According to one source, fifty percent of plaintiffs’ attorneys 
see little or no evidence of malpractice in more than half of the cases they themselves 
file.148   
                                                                
140IOM, supra note 3, at 4-5. 
141For a recent article iterating the inconsistency of fault-finding tort litigation with 
implementation of injury prevention regimes, see David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, 
No-Fault Compensation for Medical Injuries, 286 JAMA 217 (2001).  But the article’s 
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See infra notes  165-69 and accompanying text.  Studdert and Brennan also advocate a regime 
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908, 915 (1993)). 
148Michael B. Van Scoy-Mosher, An Rx for the Malpractice Explosion, L.A. TIMES, June 
28, 1983, at 4 (reviewing D. FLASTER:  A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF PATIENTS AND 
DOCTORS (1983)). 
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As a result, although the current system often undercompensates deserving 
claimants, it also can grossly overcompensate other claimants.  Most serious disputes 
about damages in tort law focus not so much on payments for actual economic 
damages resulting from an injury (i.e., lost wages and medical expenses), but on the 
validity of payments for the plaintiff’s non-economic, or intangible, harms.149  Tort 
law traditionally awards plaintiffs money for the “pain and suffering” that 
accompanies their physical injuries; today damages for pain and suffering may also 
include compensation for the despair, humiliation, and “loss of life’s pleasures” (so-
called “hedonic damages”) that a bodily injury causes a plaintiff to endure.150  The 
law recognizes that no precise dollar value can be automatically put on physical and 
psychological hurt, but generally the more economic losses a plaintiff suffers the 
more non-economic damages the plaintiff will likely receive.151  This potential for 
high awards can often lead a plaintiff to needlessly or even fraudulently pad claims 
by setting up superfluous medical appointments, tests and treatments, running up 
wage losses in the process, so as to increase a jury’s estimation of pain and suffering 
damages.  According to the Rand Institute for Civil Justice, pain and suffering 
awards based on the amount of economic loss incurred for health care (often paid by 
one’s own or governmental health insurance) produce huge and unnecessary health 
care expenditures.152   
Granted, for those truly injured victims who are able to survive the lengthy 
process, a large monetary award, substantially based on pain and suffering damages, 
may offer some relief.  But in the end, even high awards will often not alleviate the 
emotional and economic hardship that plaintiffs may feel not only during their long 
battle for compensation, but for the remainder of their lives.  A graphic illustration of 
the frustrations associated with the current tort system’s compensation mechanism is 
contained in Barry Werth’s book Damages.153  Based on actual deposition 
transcripts, medical records, and interviews with the individual plaintiffs and 
defendants, hospital staff, lawyers, and expert medical witnesses, Werth provides a 
comprehensive account of the malpractice lawsuit that Donna and Tony Sabia filed 
in 1986 in Connecticut state court against the obstetrician and hospital that delivered 
their severely impaired child.154  Perhaps the most poignant aspect of the Werth’s 
depiction is the sense of sadness that the plaintiffs feel when their lawsuit finally 
ends with a large settlement some seven years after the filing of their claim and 
almost ten years after the birth of their child.155  Parents who, like the Sabias, seek an 
explanation and an apology from a defendant often go away frustrated, given that 
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only three to four percent of lawsuits filed actually go to trial.156  Tony Sabia 
exclaimed after the settlement proceedings:  “You mean I’m going to walk out of 
here with a check and that’s going to be it?  Is that all it means?”157 
The data compiled by tort scholars and the stories of disillusioned plaintiffs such 
as the Sabias demonstrate that the current tort scheme does not adequately address 
malpractice claims.  The one party most effective in defending today’s tort regime is 
the Association of Trial Lawyers of America [hereinafter “ATLA”], the organization 
of plaintiffs’ personal injury lawyers.  ATLA has successfully thwarted reform 
efforts at both the state and federal levels through the years, garnering support 
among America’s elected officials often through their large campaign contributions 
to political candidates—especially Democrats.158  ATLA donated $3,632,450 to 
federal candidates in the November 2000 elections, with Democrats receiving 90% 
of these funds.159  When compared to other legal groups that offered PAC money to 
federal candidates for the 2000 elections, ATLA was by far the year’s largest single 
contributor in that category.160  Historically, “between January 1989 and December 
1994 contributions from individual plaintiffs’ lawyers to all congressional candidates 
totaled $18,066,433.”161  Combining this figure with the amount of PAC monies 
donated by the ATLA over the same period, “a total of more than $30 million came 
from plaintiffs’ lawyers for federal elections.”162  To put this amount into 
perspective, “the five largest labor union contributors since 1989 contributed a total 
of $29,727,165” to federal congressional campaigns; “the ‘big three’ automakers 
(GM, Ford, and Chrysler) contributed $2,195,233” over the same period, “with ten of 
the largest oil and gas companies in the U.S. giving a total of $6,975,764.”163 
The Institute of Medicine, although recognizing the need for legal reform in the 
area of medical malpractice litigation, does not formally endorse any particular 
alternative to the current tort law model.  In the next section, we discuss various tort 
reform models, focusing principally on the Early Offers model.  We attempt to show 
that Early Offers works best to serve the goals of the IOM’s report—namely, to 
reshape the current legal environment by promoting patient safety through 
encouraging reporting, recording and study of medical errors, while by no means 
overlooking injured patients’ needs for prompt receipt of both monetary 
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compensation and a candid acknowledgment and explanation of what, if anything, 
went wrong. 
IV.  THE SOLUTION:  EARLY OFFERS 
Although it does not formally endorse any particular mode of tort reform, the 
IOM mentions two possible alternatives to the current tort regime:  no-fault 
compensation and enterprise liability.164  But, there are flaws with both reforms that 
render them less effective than the IOM report would have it.  
In the no-fault compensation model, defendants would provide claimants, 
regardless of any fault, with compensation for injuries received from medical care.165  
Generally, no-fault schemes can compensate victims more quickly and consistently 
than does the current tort system, and at a lower overall cost to society.166  No-fault 
systems are seen as effective in other contexts, most notably workers’ compensation 
and automobile insurance.167  But comparing a person’s physical health prior to an 
auto accident and identifying injuries caused by that accident are relatively easy 
tasks compared to determining similar facts in a medical malpractice case.  Prior to 
suffering negligently inflicted injury, most patients already suffer from a condition 
serious enough to warrant significant treatment or even invasive surgery; many 
would suffer some lingering infirmity regardless of whether their health care 
providers were negligent.168  In other words, distinguishing between the injuries 
caused by supposed negligent treatment and those caused by the patient’s underlying 
condition or ‘presenting complaint’ will often be simply infeasible.  Establishing the 
“causation” element in a no-fault medical services regime is thus much more 
problematic than in employment or auto accident injuries.  Therefore, the medical 
services arena would retain unmanageably complex questions under a no-fault 
system, undermining its goal of administrative simplicity.169 
Likewise, the enterprise liability theory suffers from flaws that would seem to 
render it unsuccessful as a reform to encourage reporting of errors:  in an enterprise 
liability system, legal liability for medical injuries is shifted from physicians to 
health care institutions.170  For example, under this model a hospital is exclusively 
liable in a malpractice lawsuit for any medical errors committed in the hospital by 
physicians practicing there.171  By removing the fear of personal liability from 
individual health care workers, the IOM indicates that an enterprise liability system 
might eliminate the incentive to hide errors and thus induce physicians and other 
caregivers to register mistakes with the appropriate reporting system.172  But the IOM 
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fails to recognize that other considerations might well deter a physician from 
reporting an error in an enterprise liability system.  Would not health care institutions 
resist newborn candor from doctors who are their employees or with whom they 
have a contractual relationship?  For instance, with some thirty million Americans 
belonging to Health Maintenance Organizations [hereinafter “HMOs”], many of 
which are owned by caregiving physicians, or in which they have a stake of one kind 
or another, medical professionals within an HMO maintain strong economic 
incentives for not reporting medical mistakes that might expose the enterprise to 
liability.173  
But the most serious objection to the enterprise liability model is that it is still 
based on fault and still allows for pain and suffering damages.  These two variables 
are the principal problems of the current system.  As long as they are largely retained 
unchanged, reform efforts will remain largely futile.  Thus, enterprise liability would 
mire doctors, medical institutions and patients in the same old legal swamp.   
Could a somewhat different breed of statutory reform, first proposed by the 
senior author of this article, an Early offers plan, offer a promising solution?  This 
“neo-no-fault” plan is similar to a no-fault scheme in that compensation is paid 
periodically as new losses accrue for economic (excluding non-economic) loss and 
delivered more swiftly with less hassle than under the current tort system.  But Early 
Offers differs considerably from traditional no-fault regimes such as workers’ 
compensation and no-fault auto insurance statutes:  Early Offers avoids the 
impractical task of pre-accident definitions of when no-fault payments kick in for 
adverse results from medical care.  It does this by simply creating a device whereby 
any defendant of a medical malpractice claim is given the option within 120 days 
after a claim is filed of offering to make no-fault-like periodic payment of a 
claimant’s net economic loss—120 days being a relatively prompt time frame 
compared with the current tort system.174   
The early payment offer must cover any costs, including medical and 
rehabilitation expenses as well as wage loss (beyond any collateral sources such as 
health or disability insurance already payable to the claimant), plus a reasonable 
hourly fee for the claimant’s lawyer, which would be much less than the normal 
thirty to forty percent, given the quick resolution of cases disposed of by early offers.  
But no compensation would be paid for non-economic losses such as pain and 
suffering.  A crucial feature of the plan is that a defendant who promptly offers to 
thus pay a claimant’s net economic losses forecloses further pursuit of a normal tort 
claim for non-economic losses.  In this way, the parties forgo the insurmountable 
problems mentioned above of separating ex ante the adverse effects caused by health 
care from the patient’s presenting complaint.  On the other side of the coin, offers 
can be turned down by a victim but only in the event that the defendant’s injurious 
acts are the result of intentional or wanton misconduct provable beyond a reasonable 
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doubt (or at least by clear and convincing evidence).  Thus, a crucial element of the 
tort system’s deterrence mechanism is retained:  needy plaintiffs can still win 
suitably large monetary awards under the Early Offers model through the recovery of 
both economic and non-economic damages in egregious cases of medical 
misconduct.  
To qualify as an “early offer” under the plan, the offer must be made in 
accordance with a formula for calculating damages for economic losses similar to 
those paid under no-fault schemes that would be set forth in an Early Offers statute 
passed either at the state of federal level.  In fact, the Early Offers plan has already 
been incorporated in a piece of federal legislation proposed in 1996 by Kentucky 
Republican Senator Mitch McConnell.175  Because the early offer compensates only 
for actual economic damages, some injured claimants, such as the elderly, 
homemakers, or the unemployed, might not stand to receive substantial payment 
under the system.  Hence, compensation for economic damages alone could under-
deter defendants in the event one of these individuals were injured.  However, a 
simple solution to this problem would be to stipulate an alternative of a substantial 
minimum amount to which all early offers covering serious injuries (rigorously 
defined in the statute) would be subject.176   
Because health care providers would not be required to define before the adverse 
event the conditions under which they would make an early offer, the question thus 
arises:  When would a defendant be inclined to make such an offer?  One obvious 
example of when not to make an offer would be when a defendant determines upon 
considering the disputed incident that the claimant was never even treated by the 
practitioner or medical center in question.  But apart from such stark cases, although 
the health care provider might not believe the accident was its fault, it would be 
prompted to calculate what it would likely cost to pay the claimant periodically for 
the net medical expenses and lost wages brought about by the injury.  If that sum 
turns out to be less than what the defendant would pay to defense lawyers, plus its 
likely tort exposure—with the whole panoply of possible payment of collateral 
sources and non-economic damages figuring into the equation—the defendant might 
well decide that it is worthwhile to make the early offer.  Given the huge costs of 
defending tort cases and the gamble of having to pay large sums already paid by 
collateral sources, and for intangible losses, many defendants would be prompted to 
pay for net economic losses not just in cases they are sure to lose but even in many 
cases in which the issue is legitimately in doubt.  One leading defense lawyer has 
hypothesized that of the 250 medical malpractice cases his large office was then 
defending, all in various stages of litigation, he would advise making an early offer 
in 200 (or eighty percent) of those cases if such a law were in effect.177 
Indeed, implementation of the Early Offers system would bring with it many 
benefits.  Perhaps most importantly, since the plan requires defendants to make any 
offer early in the dispute process, it ensures that victims can receive rapid and 
essential compensation when they need it most.  Both parties avoid protracted 
litigation.  In addition, the Early Offers plan crucially reduces the possibility that 
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injured parties will interpret a settlement offer as merely an opening bid in 
negotiations and as a signal that they could eventually recover much more; such a 
possibility would simply spur further litigation, with all its attendant waste and 
frustrations.  A prompt offer under the plan can also reduce the transaction costs for 
defendants (and their insurers) by paying their own lawyers for far fewer hours of 
work.  Indeed, early offers could be expected to be generated in-house by insurers.  
The Insurance Services Office has estimated that insurers’ legal defense costs 
account for fourteen percent of total operating costs of malpractice litigation.178  But 
it is not so much the insurance companies that feel the sting of these high costs for 
legal defense in tort suits—it is the American public that must absorb the resultant 
high liability premiums.  Thus, the Early Offers program should actually work to 
lower the cost of insurance that doctors need to purchase since the legal exposure of 
health care providers under Early Offers would be dramatically reduced by the 
reductions (1) in attorneys’ fees (on both sides), (2) in payment for amounts already 
paid by collateral sources and (3) in pain and suffering awards.   
Furthermore, it can also be argued that Early Offers will enhance public safety 
along the very lines urged by the IOM in To Err is Human.  Particularly relevant to 
IOM concerns, the need to make quick offers under the plan will encourage rapid 
reporting of adverse events within an organization, since the opportunity to make a 
qualifying offer can be lost if not made promptly after an adverse event.179  In 
today’s medical malpractice lawsuits, where the vast majority of medical injuries are 
not the result of “wanton,” nor certainly “intentional,” acts but at best only some 
variant of “negligence,” the Early Offers system thus provides incentives for both the 
claimant and defendant to agree to a binding early settlement, which, in turn, will 
provide a key incentive for the health care provider to reveal and report any medical 
mistakes that might have occurred in the course of a claimant’s treatment.  Indeed, 
an Early Offers statute could require a health care provider, after an early offer is 
accepted, to offer to meet with patients and/or their families to explain as fully as 
feasible, the circumstances surrounding the adverse result.  Moreover, to the extent 
that health care providers might fear that making an early offer under the plan would 
be included in the National Practitioner Data Bank, which lists medical malpractice 
payments and settlements by individual practitioners, 180 the Early Offers statute 
could specify that payments made through the Early Offers system be noted in the 
Practitioner Bank as subject to special exonerating consideration. 
Thus, in keeping with the goal of the IOM report, implementation of the Early 
Offers system would help to lessen the often myopic and counterproductive blame 
culture that permeates current tort law.  Early Offers would work to calm the 
animosities of the parties in an accident claim rather than inflaming them, as the 
current litigation culture now does, by giving defendants a healthy incentive to 
promptly acknowledge any problems and even to discuss what happened.  Under the 
current adversarial tort regime, claimants rarely receive an apology, admission of 
fault, or even an explanation of the adverse event.181  As the case involving the Sabia 
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family suggests,182 many times if a simple apology or explanation by the defendant 
could be safely tendered, it could assuage the emotions of an injured party more 
effectively than a mammoth, long-delayed monetary award for pain and suffering 
damages.  Such open and candid discussions can provide the accident victim with 
another form of valuable compensation often overlooked by the judicial system—
peace of mind.  In fact, researchers report that feelings of forgiveness and 
compassion have been proclaimed as therapeutic for accident victims because they 
reduce the anxiety and stress associated with continuing anger and resentment.183  
The Early Offers plan induces the parties to discuss what happened rather than 
forcing them to engage in the combat of the current “blame game” of tort litigation.  
In so doing, Early Offers thus promotes understanding, cooperation and swift 
compensation rather than contentious, hostile, and dilatory legal proceedings.  
In summary, Early Offers seems to be a well-suited reform in the context of 
medical malpractice law, especially in light of the recommendations proposed by the 
IOM in To Err is Human.  The Early Offers plan fosters the goals of the IOM report 
in that it helps to create a different legal culture in which the reporting of errors is 
fostered while promoting prompt and fair compensation for injured patients.  
Reviewing again the mechanics of the system, claimants have the right to deny an 
early offer if they think it can be proved that the health care provider engaged in 
wanton or intentional misconduct.  Although the burden of proof is higher in such 
cases, if a health care provider’s level of care is so bad as to legitimately raise the 
question of whether maltreatment was egregious, then that would presumably be a 
case where simply paying for economic loss is not enough.  Similarly, prolonged and 
extensive litigation in such cases would seem to be worth it.  Note too that just as 
health care providers have the option to refuse to make an early offer if they do not 
believe any claim is justified, in such instances plaintiffs have the option to pursue a 
tort claim under preexisting standards of proof, care, and damages.  Finally, if so 
many cases result in claims being pursued for wanton misconduct that the Early 
Offers plan seems counterproductive, those early offers can simply not be tendered.  
But this scenario seems unlikely given the experience under workers’ compensation 
laws, where few employees are successful in suing employers for gross 
negligence.184   
In all these ways, the plan is principally designed to motivate providers and 
claimants to resolve potential lawsuits early in those cases where proof of medical 
error is at least a realistic possibility as the cause of a patient’s injury.  By resolving 
disputes early without risk of fostering litigation, medical institutions and 
professionals would not be nearly so deterred in reporting adverse events to the 
medical error databanks proposed by the IOM.  Early Offers thus greatly reduces 
fear in acknowledging possible medical errors, allowing for greater cooperation 
between the medical profession, patients, and the legal community.  With the legal 
culture shifted through the Early Offers program, medical researchers will also be 
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able to learn more from past medical mistakes and work to design better systems of 
providing care to myriad patients across the nation. 
Critics of the Early Offers plan (most likely personal injury lawyers) might raise 
various objections to the Early Offers system.  One objection might be that the 
program is too quick in dismissing the value to a plaintiff of so-called intangible 
damages, overlooking the salutary effects that “pain and suffering” damages can 
often provide a plaintiff and society in general.  After all, in some rare cases, a 
claimant’s economic loss is exiguous compared with potential recovery of large non-
economic damages.  For example, there are times when a given injury will not 
induce a plaintiff to accrue medical expenses or inhibit a plaintiff’s earning potential, 
but rather, will result principally in a loss of love and consortium from one’s spouse 
and children, coupled with other severe non-economic injury.  Admittedly, with the 
higher standards of proof in place under the Early Offers plan that allows for 
recovery of non-economic damages only in cases of wanton or intentional 
misconduct by the defendant, many such plaintiffs will not receive monetary 
compensation for such intangible harms.  Even though money cannot solve all 
emotional problems, surely it can provide some comfort.  Moreover, for some 
plaintiffs perhaps receiving pain and suffering damages might serve other important 
functions beside fair compensation.  Recovery for non-economic damages may well 
enable the injured patient to feel more rectified, instilling faith in the judicial 
mechanism and a sense that the system is for “the little guy,” as well as providing for 
amenities that may alleviate the injured condition. 
To appease some critics, the Early Offers plan could conceivably be amended to 
mandate some payment of an amount for pain and suffering under all early offers, 
perhaps on a scheduled basis tied to degree of disability, as under workers’ 
compensation.  In deciding whether to include such provisions in the law, however, 
it must be remembered that the more requirements for payment of non-economic 
damages are added to the Early Offers scheme, the fewer early offers for payment of 
economic loss will be made in the first place.185  After all, Early Offers in its pure 
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form works through a balance:  a victim’s net economic losses are compensated 
quickly and without further litigation in exchange for his giving up the chance to sue 
for intangible damages.  This tradeoff provides incentives for both parties to settle 
swiftly.  The more these incentives are impeded by adding amendments to include 
recovery for more than net economic losses, the less likely the advantages brought 
on by Early Offers, which include the improvements in America’s medical care 
system that the plan—and the IOM—promote, will take effect. 
Even so, it is undeniable that patients who do not work or who have low-wage 
jobs, thereby suffering little or no economic damages when injured, have less 
economic earnings to recover, along with their opportunity to recover non-economic 
damages being foreclosed if an early settlement is reached.   Thus, the specter is 
raised that the Early Offers program unfairly discriminates against injured patients 
who are retired or poor or both.   
In response, first it should be noted that under the current tort system, poorer 
plaintiffs are often in a more vulnerable state than they would be under an Early 
Offers regime.  Since recovery for non-economic damages is usually based, in part at 
least, on lost earning potential, a plaintiff not in the higher income brackets is often 
not able to collect as much for “pain and suffering” as would a similarly injured 
claimant making a higher salary.  Moreover, poorer and aged plaintiffs feel the sting 
of delayed compensation under the current regime more severely than other 
claimants.  Early Offers, though not a perfect system in promoting equality amongst 
people of different economic classes, does provide poorer as well as older medical 
malpractice victims with significant improvements over the current tort system.  
Early Offers promotes the compensation of lost wages or medical expenses when 
those affected (especially less wealthy victims of medical error, or older ones with 
less time to wait) need the money the most—in the days and months immediately 
following a serious injury.186   
If an Early Offers system is enacted, it might also be argued that so many more 
injured patients will seek quick settlements that insurance rates will rise for health 
care providers.  Any added cost of medical malpractice insurance would then be 
passed to patients.  Thus, the Early Offers system, so the objection goes, would end 
up costing the average American citizen more than the current tort system.   
But, in reply, highly questionable or smaller claims are after all unlikely to 
receive an early offer in the first place—recall that the decision whether or not to 
make an offer rests with defendants.187  Medical providers (and their insurers) will 
not make an offer unless they believe doing so is more advantageous than spending 
their money for defense costs under the tort system and taking the risk of losing the 
case and ultimately paying collateral sources and large non-economic damages.188  
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But even in the unlikely event of higher premiums as more claims are filed by 
injured patients and more settlements are provided under the Early Offers system, 
this arguably would still be a vast improvement over the current legal system in 
which patients are often wrongly compensated, if at all, either too much or too little, 
and always too late.  Given in particular the high rate of iatrogenic injuries 
documented by the IOM report, if more apparently wrongfully injured people are 
compensated more expeditiously for their genuine economic losses, with much less 
money going to pay transaction costs of litigation and payment of less essential non-
economic damages, that result can be viewed as a real gain for society.189   
V.  CONCLUSION 
A high rate of medical mistakes in this country poses serious problems worthy of 
bold remedial measures.  We are all vulnerable to the devastation that these systemic 
errors can create.  The recommendations by the Institute of Medicine’s 1999 report 
provide a roadmap toward a safer health system.  But turning around the current high 
rates of medical mistakes, and the injuries and deaths resulting therefrom, is a 
mission not only for America’s medical community but for the legal establishment as 
well.  The current tort system does not adequately promote patient safety, nor does it 
fulfill the goal of swiftly and justly compensating injured patients.  The Early Offers 
plan provides efficient and readily achievable legal changes to abet the 
recommendations of the IOM while compensating injured patients for tangible losses 
with much less delay, frustration, and animosity than under the current legal regime.  
Early Offers encourages patients, health care providers and medical researchers to 
come together in a spirit of cooperation and understanding to deal with the problems 
associated with medical errors in a fair and dignified manner.  Accordingly, the 
hypocrisy of the current tort system, seeking but in fact subverting equity, should 
give way to the promise of Early Offers.  As stated by the IOM, it may be part of 
human nature to err, but it is also part of human nature to create solutions, find better 
alternatives, and meet challenges.190  Through the Early Offers approach, physicians 
(and indeed lawyers, too) will be much better able to work toward the primary goal 
of the Hippocratic Oath in serving their patients (and clients)—to “do no harm.”   
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